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Abstract 
This paper discusses investor trading schemes for CFDs, spread betting, binary options and forex, what 
are effectively financial derivatives, designed for investors to speculate on market movements. It is 
argued that it is not possible for investors to consistently ‘beat the market’ unless they have inside 
information and frequent trading will result in losses. It is also shown how these derivatives are used 
in scams and frauds designed to dupe naïve investors. The final section of the paper examines how 
the UK regulators, principally the Financial Services Authority (later the Financial Conduct Authority) 
have attempted to combat fraud and abuse and their prosecuting and preventative efforts. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over recent years there have been efforts by the UK authorities such as the FSA/FCA,i the City of 
London Police and the Serious Fraud Office to prosecute and deter investment scams involving boiler 
rooms selling shares in fake companies, the perpetrators stealing investors’ funds (Barnes, 2011b, 
2013, 2016).  As a result of this clampdown, fraudsters have looked to other types of ‘investments’ to 
sell, such as fine wines, carbon credits and foreign exchange but they have continued to sell 
investments in shares in different forms. That is, perpetrate scams involving well-known and 
established ways of profiting from share price movements without owning the shares through the use 
of what are effectively ‘derivatives’. These include contracts for difference (‘CFD’), spread betting and 
what are known as ‘binary options’ or ‘binary bets’. These, together with foreign exchange (‘forex’) 
speculation, usually also by means of CFDs, are often referred to as ‘forbin’. Put and call options are 
outside this grouping and not discussed. It is the purpose of this article to look at these types of 
‘investments’, how they are marketed and whether they are scams in the same way as shares in fake 
companies and how the authorities attempt to regulate those involved. The article is arranged as 
follows, we first examine how these derivatives work and how they are priced. We then examine the 
potential profitability of trading strategies.  Finally, we examine the law as it relates to these activities, 
how fraudsters may use these to defraud investors and the record of regulators to prosecute 
perpetrators and protect victims. 
 
2. WHAT ARE CFDS, SPREAD BETTING AND BINARY OPTIONS, ‘FORBIN’? 
An individual may invest in, buy or sell stocks and shares, bonds, foreign currency or commodities (e.g. 
gold, precious metals and natural gas) subsequently referred to as ‘assets’ through a broker, bank or 
other type of financial institution handling this kind of business. An individual may also effectively bet 
on changes in the price of these assets without actually owning them by means of forbin. Forbin 
enables a ‘punter’ (this term is used rather than ‘investor’, because no money is being ‘invested’) to 
‘bet’ (this term is used rather than ‘invest’, because that is what the transaction effectively is) on a 
rise or a fall in an asset’s price, without going to the trouble and expense of owning the asset. If the 
punter forecasts or guesses correctly, he/she wins the bet but, if they lose, they also lose the money 
‘invested’ (henceforward referred to as the ‘stake’).  
 
Forbin are contracts between two or more parties based upon the asset or assets whose value is 
determined by, or fluctuations in, that asset. Their advantage is that the punter commits a minimum 
amount of money. In financial terminology, the deal is highly levered. Another advantage is that forbin 
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provide an easy way of betting on a fall in the share price – a much easier way, in the case of securities, 
than short selling which involves their ownership. 
 
A CFD is an agreement between two parties (the broker and the punter) to pay the difference between 
the opening price and closing price of an asset.  It enables a punter to trade on live market price 
movements (‘spot’ prices) without actually owning the asset concerned and to speculate on their 
future movement, whether rising or falling. Say a punter wishes to bet that a particular stock will rise 
when its current price is 140-140.5p and he/she places a trade to buy (i.e. ‘goes long’) 10,000 shares 
as a CFD. The punter is required to make a deposit (referred to as a ‘margin’) usually between 1% and 
10% of the value of the trade. Say, the price rises to 145-145.5p and the punter decides to close his/her 
position. Let us assume that the commission on the trade is 0.2% and there are no financing charges. 
In which case, the punter makes a profit of £450 [10,000(145 – 140.5p)] less the commission of £57.10 
[(£14,050 X 0.2%) + (£14,500 X 0.2%) as the selling price is 145p] net £392.90. There is also an implicit 
charge effectively paid to the broker: the ‘bid-ask spread’, the difference between the price the broker 
‘asks’ for the stock (the ‘ask price’) here 145.5p, and the price the broker will buy the stock at (the ‘bid 
price’) here 145p. 
 
Say instead, the punter wishes to bet that the stock will fall and places a trade to sell 10,000 shares as 
a CFD (i.e. ‘goes short’). As we know, the stock’s initial price was 140-140.5p and, say, the punter 
decides to cut his/her losses and close their position when the stock’s price is 145-145.5p.  In which 
case the punter makes a loss of £450 [10,000(145 – 140.5p)] plus the commission of £57.10 (£14,000 
X 0.2%) + (£14,550 X 0.2%), a total cost of £507.10, again assuming there is no financing charge. 
 
 
A few points about this: it would have cost the punter £14,500 to buy 10,000 shares but because 
he/she is using a CFD, they will only be required to make a deposit, say 5%, in which case £702.50 
(10,000 X 140.5p X 0.05). This means that a punter can make a much larger bet for the same amount 
of money using a CFD rather than purchase the stock. With a 5% margin, the punter may make a bet 
20 times as large for the same initial payment. However, the risk is correspondingly increased and a 
loss could exceed the deposit. For example, in the second case, because the punter lost £507.10 the 
deposit carried forward has fallen from £702.50 to £195.40. In this illustration, there was no financing 
charge. This may not always be the case, especially if the contract is extended beyond the current day 
of trading when ‘overnight’ fee may be charged based on current interest rates and the length of the 
holding period.  
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Spread betting is similar. It enables the punter to trade on price movements of these types of assets 
without actually owning them, again, whether rising or falling. Say the punter wants to go long (‘buy’) 
shares which are currently trading at 548 - 550p and he/she decides to place a buy spread bet of £10 
per point. This means that, for each penny the shares rise above 550p, the punter would make £10 
profit. The value of the spread bet is £5,500 (£10 x 550p). The margin required, again, is typically 
between 1% and 10% of the value of the position, say 5%, in which case it would have been necessary 
to deposit £275 (£5,500 X 5%). 
 
A binary option (sometimes referred to as an ‘all-or-nothing option’ or ‘fixed-return option’) is a 
financial option in which the payoff is either a fixed monetary amount (win) or nothing at all (lose). It 
is necessary to clarify the term: an ‘option’ is an agreed right to buy or sell an underlying asset at a 
specified price within a specified timeframe. As binary trading does not involve the right to buy an 
underlying asset, technically, it is not an option and, in this sense, the term is misleading and incorrect. 
A binary option is little more than a simple bet, hence the more appropriate term ‘binary bet’. For 
example, a bet whether the price of an asset will rise above or fall below its current price. If the punter 
chooses the correct direction, he/she wins and receives typically between 70 % and 100% of the stake; 
if he/she is incorrect, they lose the entire stake. (This is referred to as a ‘high/low binary option’.) Say 
a punter bets that the FTSE 100 would fall in 15 minutes and at the end of that period it is lower and 
the broker pays 85% of the stake on a win, he/she makes a profit of £37.50 (£50 X 0.85). However, say 
the FTSE 100 rose, the punter would lose the £50.  
 
There are many variations to the bets available for the punter, e.g. ‘one touch’ binary options where 
the punter can bet that an asset price will (or will not) touch (or reach) a specified price, and ‘zone 
binary options’ or ‘boundary trading’, in which the punter can bet that an asset price will be within (or 
outside) a specified range up to the maturity of the option. Often, no commission and financial charges 
are made for binary options as the terms of the trade are sufficiently profitable for the broker. There 
may be no margin required, providing an incentive for the punter but increasing the risk considerably. 
A broker may also offer bonuses to punters to encourage them to trade. All of these trades have 
variations and some have substantial pay-outs (as high as 300%) for example, in order to achieve the 
pay-out in a ‘one touch trade’, the punter would need to opt for a price that would be hard to reach.
  
Bonuses have been an important marketing device for binary options attracting controversy. The 
offers of free money or matching deposits with bonuses are made not only because the broker expects 
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they will attract new business but also because they are unlikely to be paid out. Most importantly, the 
bonus is not a cash bonus but a leverage-based bonus, i.e. it is added to the deposit, thereby raising 
the amount available to bet, causing the punter to risk larger amounts of money and the initial deposit 
more quickly.  
 
The motives behind these types of bonuses have been recognised by commentators and regulators, 
and punters have been urged not to take up the offers or, at least, study the terms and conditions. In 
some countries, e.g. France, brokers have been particularly aggressive, promising bonuses of up to 
five times the amount of a client’s deposit to attract more traders. As a result of complaints, the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) published a guideline in October 2016 mandating 
national regulators to withdraw the deposit bonus system. Whilst most regulated brokerage firms 
complied with the new requirements, others complied but offered unregulated products containing 
bonuses for clients to transfer their trading to, others started offering bonuses to clients from outside 
the EU. 
 
Currency trading, commonly referred to as ‘forex’, is usually done by means of CFDs. Forex is the 
largest financial market in the world, with US$1.5 trillion changing hands every day. The market is very 
liquid, meaning it is easy to buy and sell currencies, and the market is open 24 hours. In the UK to 
speculate in forex as an investment, an individual may open a CFD account with a CFD broker, or a  
spread betting account, rather than have buy and sell the currency. In the US, where spread betting 
and CFDs are not available, it is necessary to open a forex trading account with a specialist forex 
broker.  
 
Finally, a note about some technical terms relating to forex. All forex is quoted in terms of one currency 
versus another, i.e. a ‘base’ and a ‘counter’ currency. For example, in the case of the Euro, EUR/USD, 
EUR is the base currency and USD (US dollar) is the counter currency and is expressed as the value of 
one Euro in US dollars. If the punter thinks the base currency will rise (‘strengthen’) and/or the counter 
currency will fall (‘weaken’) he/she will buy (i.e. ‘go long’) Euro. If he/she thinks it will weaken, he/she 
will sell (i.e. ‘go short’). Most currencies are quoted to five decimal places where the change in the 
fourth decimal place (0.001) is referred to as a ‘pip’. So, if EUR/USD moved from 1.33800 to 1.33920, 
it is said to have risen by 12 pips. A ‘lot’ (as in ‘price per lot’) is the standard trading term for an order 
of 100,000 units of the base currency. The term ‘round term’ refers to a single completed trade, i.e. 
both a buy and a sell, as opposed to half of the full trade, i.e. a buy or a sell. 
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Just a few other basics: spread-bets usually have a fixed timescale whereas CFDs do not. ‘Long’ CFD 
positions attract daily finance charges and ‘short’ CFD positions earn interest. But no time-related 
charge or benefit applies to spread-betting. Spread betting and binary trading wins are exempt from 
capital gains tax as they are classed as gambling and not taxable in the UK but CFD profits are liable to 
be taxed. On the other hand, spread-betting and binary trading losses are not deductible against tax, 
while CFD losses are. However, if that transaction is for commercial purposes (e.g. if it is made 
strategically as a hedge to offset the risks attached to direct investment in a security) any profits that 
arise from it may be regarded as part of a wider pattern of activity and taxable. Also, all three avoid 
stamp duty (the current rate for UK shares is 0.5%) as they do not involve actual share ownership. For 
comparisons, see Table 1. It is usually necessary to pay the broker within three days. However, this 
may be extended, typically to 5, 10, 20 or 25 days, known as a ‘T’ settlement system and referred to 
as ‘T-5’ and so on.ii This may have the effect of creating a CFD in which the punter is able to buy and 
sell before the pay date. 
 
Table 1. 
Forbin types and direct purchase/sale of assets compared 
 
 CFD Spread betting Binary options Direct 
purchase/sale 
Commission  
 
0.1% - 0.5% of the 
value of the trade.  
0.1% - 0.5% of 
the value of the 
trade. 
Depends on the 
option’s terms; 
none may be 
required. 
1% - 2% of the 
value of the trade. 
‘Bid-ask’ 
Spread 
implicit Implicit Implicit implicit 
Deposit or 
‘Margin’ 
Required.  
1% - 10% of the 
value of the trade, 
typically 5%. 
Required. 1% - 
10% of the 
value of the 
trade, typically 
5%. 
Depends on the 
option’s terms; 
none may be 
required. 
None 
Financial 
‘overnight’ 
fees 
[Annual or 
monthly LIBOR 
rate, or similar ±, 
(depending on 
whether long or 
short) 
administration 
charge] X value of 
the trade 
Daily funded 
bets (‘DFB’) 
charged by 
broker. 
Depends on the 
option’s terms; 
none may be 
required. 
Not relevant 
Tax on profits Liable to capital 
gains tax  
None None Liable to capital 
gains tax 
Stamp duty None None None 0.5% 
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Regulation FSA/FCA, Financial 
Ombudsman 
FSA/FCA, 
Financial 
Ombudsman 
FSA/FCA, Financial 
Ombudsman, 
previously, UK 
Gambling 
Commission 
FSA/FCA, Financial 
Ombudsman 
 
3. TRADING  
A punter may make his/her own trading decisions, use the broker’s expertise or even employ a 
professional. Brokers offer various levels of service. ‘Execution only’ is restricted to execution of 
trades without the client receiving any advice about the merits, risk or suitability of an investment. 
Alternatively, an advisory service may be provided by the broker at a cost in which the punter makes 
the final decisions but the broker offers advice. A discretionary service may also be available in which 
the broker manages the portfolio. It is assumed here that the investor makes the decision and this 
section discusses the strategies available. 
 
Whilst a punter cannot theoretically out-perform the market in the long term (this is discussed later), 
he/she can adopt certain strategies to maximise their returns:  
(1) day trading where a punter buys if he/she considers the price to be relatively low or sell if they 
consider it relatively high. The concept of prices moving randomly between ‘tramlines’ is sometimes 
used to illustrate the point and explained later, 
(2) taking a more strategic holding if he/she thinks there is likely to be a major shift or correction (e.g. 
Brexit) and  
(3) by means of consistent buying or selling on a massive scale to affect a price and force it up or 
down.iii 
 
The problem with (1) for the non-professional is the transaction costs (the bid-ask spread plus fees 
and commissions) which may be large relative to the usual daily price changes. Having said that, even 
though, theoretically no one can consistently and significantly out-perform the market, an 
experienced trader may trade successfully assuming the transaction costs are minimised and an expert 
with an understanding of the economic factors relating to the asset in question (whether it be a 
company, commodity or currency) may be able to make an informed long-term forecast of likely price 
shifts and corrections. 
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Trading strategies.  
There are two ‘rational’ approaches to buying and selling shares: computing what a share is 
theoretically worth (its ‘intrinsic value’) and comparing this to the market price. If the intrinsic value 
is significantly greater than the market price, the punter would buy the stock; if it is below the market 
price, he/she would sell. This is sometimes referred to a ‘fundamental analysis’.  
 
Calculating intrinsic values is not the only basis on which an investor may decide to buy or sell shares. 
An alternative is a ‘behavioural’ rather than a rational approach and known as ‘technical analysis’ or 
chartism’. A chartist is someone who studies charts of the movement of an asset’s prices over time 
looking for patterns in the hope of predicting future price changes from previous trends. Chartists 
believe that all the important information about a company's performance is already reflected in a 
share price and represents what investors believe to be its intrinsic value. The study of price 
movements is, therefore, all that is necessary to make investment decisions. Chartists argue it is an 
art involving intuition, experience and skill; given the same graph, two chartists are likely to interpret 
it in different ways and make different buy and sell decisions.  
 
It is not possible to fully explain chartists’ techniques here but we can examine some of the basic 
principles and tools. As mentioned earlier, rational investors buy or sell when the difference between 
a stock’s market price and what they consider to be its intrinsic value is sufficient to cover the 
‘transaction costs’ involved in buying and selling. Transaction costs will therefore help the price stay 
within those bounds. If the share price moves outside what are sometimes referred to as ‘tram lines’, 
this may be interpreted as a revision in investors’ beliefs about the intrinsic value.  See Figure 1 for an 
example.iv 
 
Chartists also believe that investors are conscious of the price at which they bought a share. Say a 
share has been traded around 100p over a long period during which many investors bought. Suppose 
the price fell to 80p. Chartists believe that those investors who had bought at 100p would not be 
prepared to take the loss but simply wait for it to rise to above 100p. As a result, the price of 100p 
becomes a ‘resistance area’. Each time the share price falls below 100p again, the theory holds that 
the resistance level becomes even harder to cross as more investors will have bought at that price or 
above. An extension of this psychology is the ‘support level’ or ‘support area’. A chartist may argue 
that those investors who sold shares when the market was low and saw the share price rise, would be 
keen to buy it again at the price at which they sold. If this is so, the original level (100p in the 
illustration) also becomes a support area which becomes stronger on each successive fall. Therefore, 
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if a share price drops to a support area and it then begins to rise, other traders may soon join in forcing 
the share price up leaving the resistance area behind. 
 
Figure 1 
Daily share prices (pence) between 8 November 2017 and 8 February 2018 for Whitbread plc 
showing tramlines 
 
 
 
So far, we have assumed that there is no change in the asset’s intrinsic value, i.e. the ‘tram lines’ are 
horizontal. A share price may ‘break out’ of these, veering upwards or downwards. Let us say, the 
former; in which case, there will be pressure for it to continue in that direction and a rising tram line 
will be the result. There are other recognizable patterns. Probably the most famous is the ‘head and 
shoulders’.  This is a large price rise that is eventually halted, perhaps by profit taking by existing 
shareholders. As a consequence, the share price falls for a short period before continuing its steep 
rise. This is the first ‘shoulder’. The rise cannot continue indefinitely and the price will eventually peak. 
A similar situation may occur on the way down. The shoulder in this case represents a temporary halt 
in the fall in the share price. Why should such patterns exist? There is one very good reason: if 
sufficient investors believe that a recognised pattern is developing and a second shoulder is expected, 
they will trade on that belief, causing it to happen. See Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 
Daily share price chart between 1 January 2016 and 31 October 2016 for Kolar Gold plc showing 
‘head and shoulders’. 
 
 
 
 
 
In retrospect, of course, the head and shoulders pattern is recognisable. It may not be so during its 
formation (say mid-way through the price hike when in Kolar’s case the price was about 2p) and 
chartists who were presented with the graph at that time may have disagreed about its likely outcome. 
Some may have recognised it as a developing head and shoulders whilst others may have not. 
 
Some people have suggested various strategies to out-perform the market. For example, ‘Bollinger 
bands’ (https://www.bollingerbands.com) named after their inventor, Jon Bollinger, refer to upper 
and lower limits in terms of the distance of the current price from its simple moving average. This 
simple moving average may be based on a specified length of period, e.g. over the past week. They 
are set at above and below this moving average at a distance depending on the volatility of earlier 
price changes. Typically, this is set at two standard deviations of the average of earlier price volatility 
and should identify conditions in which an asset is under- or over-priced. Some traders wait for 
volatility to narrow to help identify ‘breakouts’. See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 
Daily share price chart between 2 December 2010 and 31 October 2016 for Scotgold plc 
showing Bollinger bands 
 
Another trading ‘strategy’ is the use of the ‘Golden Cross’ to indicate bullish behaviour prompting the 
punter to bet on further price rises. Typically, this uses the 50-day simple moving average and a 
corresponding 200-day moving average. If the former crosses over the latter, this suggests sustained 
upward pressure on the asset’s price. See Figure 3. In a similar way, the ‘Death Cross’ indicates bearish 
activity when the 50-day simple moving average falls below the 200-day moving average, prompting 
the punter to bet on further price falls. 
 
There is very little empirical evidence for chartists being able (or unable) to outperform the market 
and earn above average returns in this way. One reason for this is because chartists do not necessarily 
use mechanistic buy and sell rules but their skill and intuition in making such decisions. It is, therefore, 
not possible for a researcher to know and model a chartist’s decision making. As a result, it cannot be 
said conclusively that chartism does not work and remains an open question.  
 
4. WHY IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PROFIT IN THE LONG TERM FROM THESE 
SCHEMES 
The principles discussed above in the context of stocks and shares equally apply to foreign exchange 
and commodity markets as daily price changes are determined by supply and demand and market 
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makers need to balance their books. These markets are ‘efficient’ as in order to achieve this, market 
makers need to adjust their prices immediately to new information. This means that no one can out-
perform the market (in the sense of getting a significantly and consistently higher return for their 
investment) without inside information or is able in some way to influence the market. It also means 
that at any point in time no one knows which way a price will move next as they don’t know what the 
next piece of news affecting prices and supply and demand will be. As a result, prices are said to follow 
a ‘random walk’, i.e. one price change is uncorrelated with the next price change and is just as likely 
to move in one direction or the other. The first person to draw attention to this in respect of 
commodity prices was Kendall (1953), a statistician but the idea was first put forward by Bachelier 
(1900) and, probably the first person to notice the random nature of commodity prices was Working 
(1834). The random nature of share prices and the reasons for this became a popular topic of 
discussion in the 1960s for both statisticians and finance academics (see, for example, Cootner, 1964, 
and Brearley, 1969). For an authoritative modern review of the evidence see Brearley and Myers 
(2016) chapter 13. Because this is no longer an interesting empirical question there have been no 
recently published statistical studies. However, in the case of the three companies whose share prices 
are studied in this paper for other reasons, I have computed correlation statistics between a share 
price change on one day and the change the following day. These are shown in Table 2. It will be seen 
that the estimated correlation coefficients are very small and not significantly different to zero, 
strongly indicating that, as expected there is no correlation. (Correlation coefficients range from -1, 
indicating a negative relationship, to+1, a positive relationship; and 0 no relationship where the 
numbers are independent of one another). There is therefore no support the proposition that past 
price changes can be used to forecast future price changes. 
 
Table 2 
Correlation coefficients measuring the correlation between the share price change during one day 
and the share price change during the following day 
 
Company Correlation 
coefficient 
Share price trading period 
Kolar Gold plc -0.00359 1 January 2016 to 31 October 2016 
Whitbread plc 0.07919 1 January 2010 to 31 October 2016 
Scotgold plc -0.00617 2 December 2010 to 31 October 2016 
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Daily price changes may not simply be in response to changes in supply and demand but small revisions 
of expectations about a company’s prospects as they affect it future earnings and dividends. The price 
implications of a new piece of news may not be immediately obvious to the market. Not all the 
information may come out immediately. Take for example, the election of Donald Trump as US 
President in 2016. Not only did the market not expect this, it had little knowledge of the likely 
implications and so the immediate change in prices to this information would be preliminary. Only 
later would we learn what his economic and other policies would be and the implications become 
clearer. Prices would then adjust to a more realistic and considered assessment. A less dramatic 
example, the likelihood of a takeover bid or the winning of a new contract for a company. 
Theoretically, the price should change with the probability of the outcome. Say a takeover bid, if it 
came, would cause the target’s share price by 30%. Until the final announcement and publication of 
the terms, the share price would only partially adjust to this as it was uncertain. So, if it were 50% 
likely, the cumulative price increase in response to the news so far would be around 15%. When the 
final announcement is made, the price will adjust to the actual terms. It could, be that the bidder 
decides not make the bid and when this is known or realised, the price will fall back to what it was 
originally reflecting the change in the probability. 
 
Regression to the mean  
In statistics, regression to the mean is a principle (or law) that states that the variation in the average 
of a variable (or number) will decrease as the population increases. Take the tossing of a coin; the 
probability of turning a head is 0.5, as is the probability of turning of a tail. If you toss a coin, say twice, 
the probability of getting one of each is quite low but if you tossed the coin many times the number 
of heads and tails would soon converge on 50:50, although not necessarily precisely; if it were tossed 
100 times, it is unlikely that you would get precisely 50 heads and 50 tails. As an illustration, I obtained 
100 random numbers between 1 and 100 from a random number database. As will be see from Figure 
4, their average quickly converges on the theoretical average (50.5) although not precisely. Here, it is 
52.96. 
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Figure 4 
Chart of the average of 100 random numbers between 1 and 100 (average 50.5) as the sample 
(‘cumulative average’) is increased to 100 (The first random number was 21, the second 12). 
 
 
In finance, regression to the mean, has particular relevance; for example, in time series data such as 
earnings per share and price movements. We would expect the standard deviation of average returns 
or daily share price movements to decline with the length or size of the sample; in other words, to 
follow a random walk. See Figure 5 which shows the rapid regression to the mean of cumulative 
average daily share price changes for Whitbread for the 100 days between 15 June and 31 October 
2016. 
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Figure 5 
Cumulative average daily price changes for Whitbread plc  
15June 2016 to 31 October 2016 (100 days). 
 
 
There is also the matter of transaction costs affecting an investor’s returns from trading. Even though 
the chance of winning on a binary option may be as high as 0.5, it must be remembered that the 
punter needs to do better than that to cover the broker’s costs which may be considerable. What is 
the required success rate to at least break even? This may be calculated as follows where the 
probability of winning is p, the broker’s costs are y and the stake is x. In which case, where there is a 
100% pay-out on success, the break-even point is p(1 – y)x = (1 – p)(1 – y)x which simplifies to  p = (y 
+ 1)/2. However, where the pay-out is not 100% (70% is common) the above needs to include the pay-
out percentage, z, and becomes P = (y + 1)/(z + y + 1 – zy).  In which case, where z = 0.7 and y = 0.1, 
the required probability of success rises from 0.5 to 0.636. See Figure 6 which shows the required 
probability of success to break even depending on percentage brokerage fees and pay-out 
percentages. 
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Figure 6 
Diagram showing the required probability of success to break even depending on percentage 
brokerage fees and pay-out. 
 
5. IRRATIONALITY  
I have argued that it is only possible to out-perform the market if an investor is able to forecast better 
than the market as a whole or has inside information. In order to protect or maximise his/her returns, 
it is also necessary for the investor to forecast, not what the market should, but what it is likely to 
believe as the market is not always rational but has fads, fashions, moods and susceptible to the 
herding instinct. 
 
Large price rises followed by collapse, often referred to as ‘bubbles’, and its irrationality more 
generally, are nowadays a recognised feature of the financial markets. The term ‘irrational 
exuberance’ is also used to describe the phenomenon but, although a recent term, does not represent 
a new theory or offer a new understanding of the reasons for the occurrence. v The phenomenon was 
first recognized by Charles Mackay writing in 1841 who cited various examples, the most famous case 
being ‘tulipmania’ in Holland. The story of tulipmania begins in 1559 when the first tulip bulbs were 
brought from Constantinople to Holland and Germany, and people fell in love with them. Soon tulips 
became a status symbol for the wealthy, their bulbs hard to get.  Although early buyers were people 
who truly prized the lovely flowers, later buyers primarily considered their bulbs an investment. Soon 
speculators became involved and tulip bulbs began to be traded on the local exchanges. By 1634, the 
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craze of owning tulips had spread to the Dutch middle classes and merchants and shopkeepers vied 
with one another for single tulip bulbs. At the height of tulip mania in 1635, a single tulip bulb was 
worth £20,000 in today’s prices. Tulip bulbs were traded on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and other 
exchanges in Europe. Trade grew so rapidly that tulip notaries and clerks were appointed to record 
transactions and public laws and regulations were developed to control the tulip craze. However, in 
1636, people began to sell their holdings and the price of tulip bulbs began to weaken, slowly at first, 
and then rapidly. Confidence was soon destroyed, and panic seized the market. Within six weeks, 
prices had fallen by 90 per cent and defaults on contracts and liens on owners were widespread. At 
first the Dutch government refused to interfere but later was forced to act. All contracts prior to 
November 1636 were declared null and void but prices continued to fall. In Amsterdam, judges 
unanimously refused to uphold tulip contracts and treated them as gambling activities and no court 
in Holland would enforce payment. The price of tulip bulbs eventually fell to, in real terms, less than 
their price today. Perhaps the final word should be left to Isaac Newton who, like Jonathan Swift, had 
lost money on the South Sea bubble (circa 1720) when he remarked ‘I can calculate the movement of 
the stars, but not the madness of men’. 
 
Keynes (1936) was the first to develop an explanation of this behaviour: what is referred to as his 
‘biggest fool’ theory. He argued that investors do not estimate an asset’s intrinsic value mentioned 
earlier to compare with the market price. Instead, he said, investors are more interested in whether 
other investors think a share will rise in price. In Keynes’ opinion, this was rational; a company’s 
intrinsic value is irrelevant. He used the analogy of attempting to forecast the winner of a beauty 
contest. Around that time, it was common for London newspapers to run competitions requiring 
readers to choose a set of six faces from 100 photographs of women that were the ‘most beautiful’. 
The names of those who picked the most popular faces were then entered into a raffle for a prize. The 
most obvious strategy would be to choose the six faces that, in the opinion of the reader, are the most 
beautiful. Keynes said that a better approach would be to attempt to identify those faces most likely 
to be chosen by the public. This could be carried one step further to take into account the fact that 
other entrants would also be making their decision based on knowledge of public perceptions. The 
strategy could be extended to the next order and so on, at each level attempting to predict the 
eventual outcome of the process based on the reasoning of others. 
 
Keynes believed that the stock market behaved in a similar way. People priced shares, not on what 
they thought their fundamental values were, but on what they thought everyone else thought they 
were worth. If an investor thought that the price of a share price would rise and that other investors 
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would buy it, he/she would also buy, increasing the demand for the stock and forcing its price up 
further. Eventually, the price would be so far removed from reality that investors realise this and stop 
buying. The process would then go into reverse where people think the share price will fall and decide 
to sell. The person who bought at the top of the market was described by Keynes as the ‘biggest fool’. 
Although Keynes used the theory to explain the role of interest rate movements in the economy 
(Keynes, 1936) his understanding derives from his own dealings on the stock market on behalf of his 
Cambridge college which were very successful earning it millions of pounds.  
 
The irrationality of the markets as an important factor in financial history is well known and well 
documented. Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) argue and present examples to show that financially 
fuelled boom-and-bust cycles frequently occur. They extend the notion of irrationality of financial 
markets to whole economies and economic sectors. They cite Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis 
(‘FIH’) (Minsky, 1977, 1982, 1989) which builds on Keynes’ theory (Minsky was a student of Keynes 
and very much influenced by him) as the principal theory to underpin their observations. The FIH 
attempts to explain the irrationality of financial markets during periods of extreme boom and bust 
and leading to a financial crisis. According to Minsky, the cycle takes the following form: boom - 
overestimation of expected returns - euphoria and band-wagon effect - profit-taking - the recognition 
that earlier expectations were unjustified.  In the final stage as losses occur, panic sets in (the irrational 
herding instinct) together with revulsion and the overall discrediting of the subject of the boom in the 
first place. See Figure 7. The theory may apply to any asset and even a whole economy. As expansion 
develops, optimism increases and beliefs about the proper level of debt and risk change. Here, prices 
of financial assets rise and the general level of speculation increases. (‘speculation’ refers to attempts 
by investors to bet on the future direction and psychology of the market, Minsky, 1975, pp.120-23).  
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Figure 7 
Keynes’ ‘Biggest Fool’, Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis: FTSE 100 1 December 2017 to 2 
February 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
6. REGULATION 
The law  
CFD, spread betting and forex brokerage firms in the UK are regulated by FSA/FCA. Brokers are either 
authorised by FSA/FCA under Section 19 FSMA 2000, or ESMA. The ESMA authorised status is given to 
firms that are authorised in another European Economic Area (‘EEA’) state and given a ‘passport’ by 
FSA/FCA to provide cross border services to UK citizens according to the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC (‘MIFID’). These firms are regulated in their home country, and not 
by the FSA, but must comply with standards agreed across all EEA countries.  
 
Until January 2018, binary options in the UK were effectively regulated by the Gambling Commission 
but, from 3 January 2018, UK firms offering these products are required to be authorised by the FCA. 
This means that firms will be supervised by the FCA and  binary options will be subject to the regulatory 
regime for investment products and complaints will be handled by the Financial Ombudsman Service.  
 
In the EU, binary options are regarded regulated as investment products. Under EU financial services 
law, brokerage firms that are legally established and authorised in an EEA country may do business in 
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any other EEA country once certain procedural safeguards are met. vi The EEA includes all EU countries 
plus Norway, Lichtenstein, and Iceland. Some nations began to introduce regulations but it was the 
Cyprus regulations operated by the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (‘CySec’) that was 
adopted across Europe. CySec registration is now the standard that most reputable binary options 
brokers will hold. This means that firms offering binary options trading which operate as financial 
services firms in other EEA countries are able to do business in the UK and, as a result, appear on the 
FCA’s Register of financial services firms (https://register.fca.org.uk).  
 
Although investment in binary options is popular in the UK and the EU, it is a grey area in the US. 
Binary options (known there as ‘Fixed Return Options’) are only legally available to those who 
purchase them using the American Stock Exchange, Chicago Options Exchange and Nadex.vii It is not 
legal for US citizens to purchase binary options from any other source. 
 
In the UK, FSMA 2000 Sections 205 and 206 state that If the FSA/FCA considers an authorised person 
has contravened a requirement imposed on it under the 2000 Act, it may publish a statement to that 
effect, known as a ‘Decision Notice’ or ‘Public Censure’ (Section 205) and, if there has been a 
contravention the Act, it may impose a penalty (Section 206). The criteria used by the FSA/FCA when 
deciding if an authorised business’ or individual’s conduct has been proper and satisfactory are 
contained in their ‘principles of business’ listed in Table 3. FSMA 2000, Section 118 defines market 
abuse as behaviour which (a) gives, or is likely to give, a false or misleading impression as to the supply 
of, or demand for, or the price of a qualifying investment, or (b) secures the price of such an 
investment at an abnormal or artificial level.  
 
If a provider is authorised by the FSA/FCA and fails, closes down, or goes into liquidation and there is 
a deficiency in the client money bank account, customers are likely to be covered by the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme (‘FSCS’) although the maximum it would pay out per client is £50,000. 
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Table 3 
FSA/FCA Principles of Business 
1. Integrity: A firm must conduct its business with integrity. 
2. Skill, care and diligence: A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence. 
3. Management and control: A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs 
responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems. 
4. Financial prudence: A firm must maintain adequate financial resources. 
5. Market conduct: A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct. 
6. Customers' interests: A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat 
them fairly. 
7. Communications with clients: A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients 
and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading. 
8. Conflicts of interest: A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its 
customers and between a customer and another client. 
9. Customers: relationships of trust: A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of 
its advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its judgment. 
10. Clients' assets: A firm must arrange adequate protection for clients' assets when it is 
responsible for them. 
11. Relations with regulators: A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way 
and must disclose to the appropriate regulator appropriately anything relating to the firm of 
which that regulator would reasonably expect. 
 
 
Common scams and frauds 
Forex and CFDs 
These include: 
Misappropriation of money from managed accounts by a fraudulent broker or agent.  
Manipulation of bid-ask spreads which involves a dishonest broker using fraudulent prices rather 
than market bid-ask prices, i.e. charging a higher ask price and/or lower bid price compared to the 
market price. 
Commingling which is the fraudulent pooling of customers’ contributions into a single fund.  
Ponzi or pyramid schemes where high returns from a small initial investment are promised. 
However, the investment does not actually exist and the initial returns are funded by money paid 
22 
 
in by other members of the scheme. The scheme continues until the fund is unable to fund 
withdrawals and collapses. 
Boiler room operations. This is where individuals are pressured into buying shares in a worthless 
investment on the promise that the returns will be high; the fraudsters disappearing with investors’ 
money. 
Churning. A broker usually receives a commission from a client each time a security is bought or 
sold. Churning refers to the excessive buying and selling of securities by a broker or an employee 
to generate excessive commissions. They would be guilty of churning if the amount of trading is 
excessive compared to the amount of money invested. In order to establish this, it would be 
necessary to examine and count the number of transactions, calculate the annualized rate of return 
necessary to cover the commissions charged and compare this to the actual net return on the 
account. 
Front Running. It is quite possible that an order to buy or sell a security submitted by a customer, 
if sufficiently large, will affect the price of the security. Front running is the illegal practice of a 
broker executing an order on a security for its own account taking advantage of inside knowledge 
of the pending order from its customer.  
Unauthorised trading and ‘cloning’. As mentioned earlier, firms offering forex, CFDs, binary options 
and similar products in the UK need to be authorised by the FSA/FCA. However, unauthorised firms, 
claiming to be based in the UK and authorised, sometimes attempt to sell these services. Some, 
referred to as ‘clones’, attempt to copy the name and details of an authorised firm. 
‘Layering’. This is high-frequency trading involving the placing of large orders by a broker at just 
above or just below the best quotes on the order book that they never intend to execute in order 
to influence the market price.  
 
Binary options 
Action Fraud, the UK’s national reporting centre for fraud (https://actionfraud.police.uk) stated on 18 
October 2017 that 2,065 people had reported to them of being victims of binary options fraud since 
2012 and had lost almost £60m, the average person losing £22,811. Action Fraud also reported that 
in the first half of 2017, 697 people claimed to have lost over £18m.  
 
In addition to the forex and CFDs frauds mentioned above, the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau and 
Action Fraud state that dishonest firms offering binary options: 
• Offer a higher than average return on an investment. 
• Refuse to credit customer accounts. 
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• Break all contact with the customer. 
• Manipulate software to distort prices and pay outs. 
They also remark about the way binary options are marketed. Social media websites and apps are 
often used to attract young people to binary options and (as the victims allege) defraud them.  Whilst 
a traditional investment may take months or years to mature, a binary option trade can be done 
quickly and the punter can see an immediate return. This attracts a section of society previously 
unavailable. Victims are predominately from the UK, a third of who are under 30 years old and 9% 
under the age of 20. This compares with victims of traditional investment scheme frauds who are 
typically over 60 years old. Action Fraud say that fraudsters set up fake profiles on popular social media 
websites. They purport to be successful binary options traders, often adding photographs of 
themselves in exclusive locations such as high-class restaurants or posing with luxury items such as 
valuable cars, clothes and watches in order to give the appearance of wealth and success. They may 
also include ‘testimonials’ from happy customers in the form of text messages or email conversations. 
These are usually fake. The fraudsters will then seek out potential victims, offering them the chance 
to ‘invest’. Frequently the fraudster will tell a victim that their ‘trading’ has been successful and then 
request more money be sent. In some instances, the fraudsters also request further funds in order to 
release the victim’s money.  
 
Table 4 
FSA/FCA actions against forbin brokers 
Date Brokerage Action 
5/5/10 Alpari (UK) 
Limited 
Under FSMA 2000, Section 206 fined £140,000 for 
breaches of Principle 3 of the Principles for Businesses  
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-
notices/alpari.pdf. 
15/3/11 ActivTrades Under FSMA 2000, Section 206 fined £85,750 for 
breaches of Principles 3 and 10 of the FSA’s Principles for 
Businesses www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-
notices/activtrades.pdf 
14/6/11 B.M. Alexander FSA order prohibiting Mr Alexander from performing any 
regulated activity. Fined under FSMA 2000 Section 
118(5) (a) and (b) £700,000 in respect of market abuse 
and ordered to pay restitution of £322,818 to the firms 
which suffered a loss. 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/alexander_barnett.pdf 
28/1/13 
 
Canada Inc 
trading as Swift 
Trade 
 
Fined £8m for engaging in manipulative trading activity 
known as ‘layering’, a form of market abuse under FSMA 
2000, Section 123(1)  
www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/7722656-
canada-inc.pdf 
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26/02/14  Forex Capital 
Markets Ltd and 
FXCM Securities 
Ltd. 
Fined £4m for allowing FXCM Group to withhold profits 
worth £6m that should have been passed on to FXCM 
UK’s clients. www.fca.org.uk/news/press-
releases/financial-conduct-authority-fines-fxcm-uk-
%C2%A34-million-making-%E2%80%98unfair-
profits%E2%80%99-and 
20/5/15 Barclays Bank PLC Fined £284m for failure to control its London trading 
operations in the forex market, with the result that 
traders were advantaged over other market participants. 
www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/barclays-bank-
plc-may-15.pdf 
26/5/16 Quick Pay Forex 
ltd 
Registration cancelled for its unwillingness to comply 
with its ongoing regulatory obligations.  
www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/quick-pay-
forex-limited.pdf. 
20/6/16 Banko FX Warning that it is providing financial services or products 
including forex and CFDs in the UK without FCA 
authorisation 
www.fca.org.uk/news/warnings/banco-fx-banko-fx 
20/6/16 CFD-1000 Warning that it is providing financial services or products 
including forex and CFDs in the UK without FCA 
authorisation 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/warnings/cfd-1000-limited 
12/7/16 Limited Binary Warning that firm was providing financial services or 
products in the UK without authorisation. 
www.fca.org.uk/news/warnings/limited-binary 
1/11/16 CT Option Warning that it was providing financial services or 
products not authorised by FSA. As a binary option 
provider, it should have been licensed and regulated by 
the UK Gambling Commission 
7/4/17 Worldspreads Ltd Two employees fined, £11,900 and £105,000, for 
engaging in market abuse and permanently banned from 
performing regulated activity. 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-bans-
and-fines-two-individuals-market-abuse. 
4/7/17 McClure Watters 
(FGS), 
Lanyon Astor 
Buller Ltd (LAB) 
Compliance officer fined £75,000 for failing to exercise 
due skill, care and diligence at FGS and LAB. 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-fines-
compliance-oversight-officer-pension-transfer-failings 
 
 
7. CRIMINAL CASES AND PREVENTATIVE ACTION 
Cases 
The cases brought in the UK against forbin brokers since 2009 are listed in Table 4.  There have been 
remarkably few in comparison with the number of complaints. Many cases that were reported to 
Action Fraud did not result in criminal action as they did not constitute fraud or even a scam and no 
claim would be possible with the FSCS. They were simply the result of an aggrieved punter losing 
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his/her money and looking for someone to blame. The problem is that forbin is effectively gambling 
but sold as an investment in which punters think they can participate and make profits.  
 
Prevention 
The FSA/FCA has concerns that customers are buying and trading these products they do not 
adequately understand. In December 2016, it published the results of a study of a sample of CFD firms’ 
client accounts. It found that providers of rolling forex and CFDs held £3.5bn of clients’ funds for these 
transactions of which 82% of clients lost money. The FCA has recently issued a consultation paper 
proposing a package of stricter measures to help protect consumers by limiting the risks of these 
products and raising their awareness.viii These include: 
1. Introducing standardised risk warnings and mandatory disclosure of profit-loss ratios on client 
accounts to illustrate the historical performance and the risks of these products. 
2. Setting lower leverage limits for inexperienced retail clients who have less than 12 months’ 
experience of active trading in CFDs, with a maximum of 25:1. 
3. Capping leverage at 50:1 for all retail clients and introducing lower leverage caps across different 
assets according to their risks. (Some levels of leverage currently offered to retail customers exceed 
200:1). 
4. Preventing providers from offering bonuses or other benefits to promote these products. 
 
The FCA has also recently published its concerns about binary options in which customers typically 
lose money, in many cases large amounts.ix It has also raided a number of premises in the City of 
London where it was thought unauthorized firms operated from, and published a list of 94 firms that 
do not have authorisation but are believed to be offering binary options to UK consumers in breach 
of Section 19 FSMA, 2000.x In a statement issued on 15 December 2017,xi ESMA indicated that it was 
considering measures that would ban the sale of binary options to retail investors in response to 
concerns about the sale of binary options. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
It has been argued here that whilst these markets and instruments are not intrinsically fraudulent or 
misleading, they may be open to abuse and exploitation by fraudsters. Most importantly, whilst at 
first glance they may appear to the punter to be profitable they do not constitute sound investments 
and are little more than foolish betting where the odds are stacked against and not understood by 
punters and the transaction costs are so high as to make gains virtually impossible. In most cases, 
these markets involve ‘zero sum’ gains, in which for one trader to make a profit, another will make a 
26 
 
loss. It should also be remembered that currency and stock market movements are the result of the 
actions of large financed institutions and banks who are better informed about the markets than the 
individual trader. 
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ENDNOTES 
i The Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’) replaced the ‘the Financial Services Authority (‘FSA’) in 
2013. As this article is referring to both over the period 2001 to data, ‘FSA/FCA’ is used. 
ii See http://www.thesharehub.com/2011/01/14/library-t20/ 
iii The famous example of this is ’Black Wednesday’ in 1992 when George Soros was able to force 
down the price of the pound which led to its devaluation 
https://is.muni.cz/el/1456/podzim2011/MPF_AFIN/um/27608616/27608949/Black_Wednesday.pdf  
iv  This strategy is the basis of ‘trading to win’ forex trading videos made by learntotrade.co.uk 
v It was first used on 5 December 1996 by Alan Greenspan, chairman of the US Federal Reserve 
Board to describe the behaviour of investors in the US and the mood behind the rise in stock market 
prices between 1994 and 1999. It became his most famous quotation. 
vi If an authorised firm wants to provide financial advice, set up a base or run permitted activities in 
an EEA state, it may apply for a ‘passport’ to do this. See https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/passporting. 
vii Nadex is a regulated US exchange, designated by the US Commodities Trading Commission and 
legally permitted to accept US residents as members.  
viii Consultation Paper (16/40): Enhancing conduct of business rules for firms providing contract for 
difference products to retail clients available at www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-proposes-
stricter-rules-contract-difference-products 
ixSee  https://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/binary-options 
x See https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-issues-list-unauthorised-binary-options-
providers. 
xi https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-issues-updated-statement-
preparatory-work-in-relation-cfds-binary-options 
 
                                                          
